Anonymization is the process of removing or hiding sensitive information in logs. Anonymization allows organizations to share network logs while not exposing sensitive information. However, there is an inherent trade off between the amount of information revealed in the log and the usefulness of the log to the client (the utility of a log). There are many anonymization techniques, and there are many ways to anonymize a particular log (that is, which fields to anonymize and how). Different anonymization policies will result in logs with varying levels of utility for analysis. In this paper we explore the effect of different anonymization policies on logs. We provide an empirical analysis of the effect of varying anonymization policies by looking at the number of alerts generated by an Intrusion Detection System. This is the first work to thoroughly evaluate the effect of single field anonymization policies on a data set. Our main contributions are to determine a set of fields that have a large impact on the utility of a log.
Introduction
Anonymization is the process of removing or masking information in a data set. Anonymization is being used in situations where organizations would like to share data, but are concerned with revealing sensitive information, such as system vulnerabilities, or private information of users, etc [11] .
While there has been a proliferation of anonymization tools in the recent years there is a deeper question that must be answered before anonymization can be successfully used to implement data sharing repositories. The essential idea is that there is that the data provider wants to hide as much information as possible, whereas the client (the recipient of the logs) wants as much information as possible. We call this the utility vs. security trade off.
Anonymization is inherently a procedure that results in information loss. When a log is anonymized, its utility (usefulness) is reduced. The utility of a log is a measure of the usefulness of the log to the client. Sharing logs requires the data provider (the anonymizer) to negotiate trade offs between the security and the utility of a log. The security of a log refers to the likelihood that sensitive data in the log could be revealed. If the sensitive data is not hidden, this is a certainty. However, there are attacks on anonymization algorithms that can discern the sensitive information in a log.
One on extreme, the data provider could remove all possible sensitive information from a log. This provides a high level of security -no client receiving the log, nor any attacker intercepting the log, would be able to deduce the sensitive information since it is completely removed from the data set.
However, the utility of this data set to the client is minimal. With no information in the log the client has nothing to analyze. This negates the entire purpose of log sharing.
On the other extreme, the data provider can provide the logs unmodified. While this is the best situation for the client -as it provides the most information for them -this reveals sensitive information to the client and anyone who can intercept the data.
Clearly a middle ground needs to be formulated, where the security of the information and the utility of the log can both be protected. An understanding of the trade off between security and utility will enable data providers to make appropriate decisions when anonymizing data for release.
Our objective in this paper is to evaluate anonymization policies with respect to the utility of the anonymized log. We measure utility with the IDS Utility Metric. The main questions that we want to answer are:
• How do we measure the utility of a log?
• What effect does anonymization of a particular field have on the utility of the log?
• Does the type of anonymization algorithm used affect the utility of the anonymized log?
This work is one of the first to provide a thorough analysis of the affect of anonymization on the utility of a log. We evaluate the utility of a log drawn from the 1999 MIT/Lincoln Labs DARPA evaluation test data set. We use the open source tool FLAIM to develop a set of 152 anonymization policies that can be applied to the data set. Each instance of an anonymized log was evaluated with the open source Intrusion Detection System SNORT to determine its utility. This paper contributes:
• An implementation of the IDS Utility Metric.
• A ranking of PCAP fields in terms of their effect on utility.
• An evaluation of the affect of the anonymization algorithm on utility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our log anonymization framework FLAIM. Section 3 describes the methodology of our experiments. Section 4 describes our results. Section 5 describes some of the related work in this area. Finally, Section 7 indicates the directions we would like to take with this work.
FLAIM: Framework for Log Anonymization and Information Management
The Framework for Log Anonymization and Information Management (FLAIM) 1 is a multi-level, multi-log framework that supports a diverse set of anonymization algorithms. FLAIM utilizes a modular framework that allows users to construct input modules to input their specific format of data. Users can use the diverse set of built in Anonymization Algorithms to build policies for their specific logs. FLAIM is extremely well suited to the needs of this evaluation because FLAIM has support for anonymization of PCAP traces; FLAIM comes with a rich set of powerful anonymization algorithms ; and FLAIM has an extremely flexible anonymization policy language that can be changed at run-time. This allowed us to automate the evaluation of the 152 unique anonymization policies.
In this section we overview the main types of anonymization algorithms that FLAIM provides and the anonymization policy language. More information on FLAIM can be found in [10] .
Anonymization Algorithms
The following section describes the anonymization algorithms present in FLAIM , as well as the reasoning for them being in FLAIM .
FLAIM implements many types of anonymization algorithms. A few are coupled very tightly with the data type being anonymized, but many can be applied to multiple fields. However, the default values and other configuration options may be affected by the data type. For example, while truncation can be applied to almost any field, it makes sense to truncate a MAC address by 40 bits but not to do the same to a 32 bit IPv4 address. Below we discuss the different classes of anonymization algorithms FLAIM supports.
Black Marker
Black marker anonymization-a term that was coined in [11] -is equivalent, from an information theoretic point of view, to printing out a log and going over each value of a sensitive field with a black marker. This analog variant is often seen in sensitive documents retrieved from the government. FLAIM simply implements a digital equivalent. This could mean that FLAIM just deletes the field. However, that could break log analysis tools for anonymized logs. So, when performing black marker anonymization on a field, FLAIM replaces all values with a single canonical value for that field. For example, all IP addresses may be replaced with "0.0.0.0".
The BinaryBlackMarker anonymization algorithm views a field as a sequence of bits.
Truncation
Truncation works by taking a field and selecting a point after which all bits are annihilated. For a string value, you choose some middle point-not necessarily defined as a fixed number of characters from the beginning-and cut the string off after that point. For example, one could truncate the domain information from e-mail address so that "user@example.net" is replaced with simply "user". For binary values, a fixed point is chosen from the beginning of the value, and all bits after that point are set to 0-keeping the binary value the same length. So truncating after 24 bits on a binary representation of an IP address gives the class C subnet. Note that truncation of all bits simply result in a specific case of black marker anonymization. Consequently, these algorithms are not mutually exclusive. The BytesTruncation anonymization algorithm views a field as a sequence of bytes. The NumericTruncation algorithm views a field as a set of digits.
Permutation
In the most general sense, a permutation is a one-to-one and onto mapping on a set. Thus, even a block cipher is a type of permutation. There are many ways that permutations can be used. For larger binary fields, it usually makes sense to use a strong, cryptographic block cipher. Thus, if one wishes to use the same mapping later, they just save the key. This is excellent for fields like the 128 bit IPv6 address. However, there are no strong 32 bit block ciphers to do the same for IPv4 addresses. Using a larger block would require padding, and the output of the anonymization function would be larger than the input. In these cases, one can use tables to create random permutations. The problem is, of course, that one cannot save these tables as easily as a cryptographic key to keep mappings consistent between logs anonymized at different times.
In addition to random permutations that are cryptographically strong, there is sometimes a need to use structure preserving permutations for certain types of data. When differences between values must be preserved-often the case with timestamps-a simple shift can be used. Shifting all values by a certain number may be an acceptable way to permute values in some instances. For IP addresses, the subnet structure may need to be preserved without knowing the actual subnets (e.g., when analyzing router data). Prefix-preserving pseudonymization is appropriate here. This is a type of permutation uniquely applied to IP addresses, and we discuss it in detail in an example of anonymizing netfilter logs in the next section.
The MacRandomPermuation algorithm works only on MAC fields. The RandomPermutation algorithm works on numberic fields. The IPv4PrefixPreserving anonymization algorithm implements structure preserving ip address anonymization for FLAIM .
Partitioning
Partitioning is just what it sounds like. The set of possible values is partitioned into subsets-possibly by a well-defined equivalence relation-and a canonical example for each subset is chosen. Then, the anonymization function replaces every value with the canonical value from the subset to which it belongs. Black marker anonymization-how we implement it-is really just a special case where there is only one subset in the partition, namely, the entire set. Even truncation becomes a type of partitioning. For example, say that the last 8 bits of IPv4 addresses are truncated off. Then the set of IP addresses is being partitioned into class C networks. Furthermore, the canonical representation is simply the network address of the class C subnet. However, partitioning is not always so simplistic, and our next type of anonymization algorithm is a very unique type of partitioning for timestamps.
Partitioning is implemented in the Classify anonymization algorithm.
Time Unit Annihilation
Time unit annihilation is a special type of partitioning for time and date information. Timestamps can be broken down into year, month, day, hour, minute and second subfields. When this is done, one can annihilate any subset of these time units by replacing them with 0. For instance, if she annihilates the hour, minute and second information, the time has been removed but the date information retained-actually, a type of truncation. If she wipes out the year, month and day, the date information is removed but the time is unaffected. If one annihilates every subfield, she ends up performing a type of black marker anonymization on the timestamps. It is clear that this is a very general type of partitioning, but it still cannot partition in arbitrary ways. For instance, it cannot break time up into 10 minute units. The TimeUnitAnnihilation field implements this anonymization algorithm. The Annihilation algorithm works for other fields.
Enumeration
Enumeration can be very general, though FLAIM currently uses it as just an option for timestamps. However, enumeration would work on any well-ordered set. Enumeration, will first sort the records based on this field, choose a value for a first record, and for each successive record, it will choose a greater value. This preserves the order but removes any specific information. When applied to timestamps, it preserves the sequence of events, but it removes information about when they started or how far apart two events are temporally. A straightforward implementation could sort, choose a random starting time, and space all distinct timestamps apart by 1 second.
The TimeEnumeration algorithm implements enumeration for time stamps.
Anonymization Policies in FLAIM
FLAIM provides an expressive and powerful method that can be modified at run time for specifying anonymization policies. An anonymization policy is an XML file that indicates the anonymization algorithm that should be applied to the various fields in the log. The anonymization policy is evaluated by FLAIM at run-time to determine how to anonymize the log. By FLAIM having anonymization policies implemented in this way we can automate the construction of numerous policies. 
Methodology
In this section we describe the experimental framework we implemented and metrics we used to measure the utility of a log. Figure 1 depicts the methodology for our experiments. For our evaluation we use part of the DARPA 1999 evaluation data set.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Office (DARPA) set up a Intrusion Detection Evaluation testbed in 1998 and 1999. Data was captured from a simulated network that was experiencing attacks. The data is labeled with the attacks. The DARPA data set is very frequently used in evaluating intrusion detection systems [6] .
The DARPA data set is useful because it is labeled. We use a portion of the 1999 data set. Specifically, we used the inside tcpdump data from Wednesday of the second week of the evaluation.
Before evaluating anonymization we filtered all protocols except tcp from the data set. At the current moment FLAIM cannot handle protocols other than TCP.
The unanonymized data set is run through SNORT to produce the "baseline" set of alerts. We consider this the "correct" set of alerts for this data set.
The IDS metric for utility was developed in [13] . The idea is to utilize an intrusion detection system to measure the utility of an anonymized log. The alerts generated from the unanonymized file are used as a baseline against which the alerts generated by the anonymized file are compared. The difference between the alerts in the anonymized file versus the unanonymized file is a measure of the loss of utility in the log.
Theoretically, the utility of a log should measure the usefulness of the log to a security engineer. However, formalizing the tasks and knowledge needed by a security engineer is a monumental task. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) provides a convenient summary of some of the important knowledge a security Figure 1 depicts the process by which the anonymized file and its alerts are generated. Taking the data set, we apply an anonymization algorithm to it. FLAIM specifies a set of anonymization algorithms that are appropriate for the each field in a PCAP log. These are summarized in Figure 2 . In this evaluation we only consider anonymization policies over single fields. Before we can evaluate the affect of multi-field policies, we must come to an understanding of single field policies.
As Figure 2 indicates, there are 152 single field policies. We evaluate over all 152 polices, providing a thorough analysis of the affect of anonymization on tcp protocol packets in the PCAP data set.
Each anonymization algorithm has parameters that affect how it anonymizes the field. We will not go over the parameters in detail, but instead refer to the FLAIM manual [5] . Table 1 summarizes the parameter settings for the anonymization algorithms.
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Comparing Snort Alerts
Alerts generated by Snort are defined by several properties, listed in 2. The relevant fields, and their descriptions are listed below:
timestamp The timestamp of the packet on which this alert was generated. sig generator sig id The ID number of the signature that was fired. msg A description of the alert. proto The protocol of the packet on which the alert was generated. src The source ip address. srcport The source port. dst The destination ip address. dstport The destination port. id Packet id.
To determine whether two alert sets are equal we need a way of determining if two alerts are equal. Normally this can be done by comparing each field of the alerts. However, in this case the alerts generated from the anonymized log will cause alerts that are actually equal to appear unequal. To overcome this, we compare alerts on fields which will not change due to anonymization. This leads to two field sets that we use when comparing alerts. They are shown in Table 3 . Field Set 1 is used when the timestamp field has not been anonymized. Field Set 2 is used when the timestamp field has been anonymized.
Metrics for evaluating utility
Consider the set of alerts generated from the baseline file as A baseline . The set of alerts generated from the anonymized file we set as: A anony . The purpose of anonymization is to share logs whilst hiding sensitive information. Anonymization, while inherently an information reducing procedure, must be measured in terms of the amount of information that is lost in the file. The "best" anonymization policy should lose none of the information, while not adding any new information.
We can consider the IDS process as a pattern classification process. The data set is input, and the IDS classifies each packet as malicious or not. The alerts generated from the unanonymized data (which we call the baseline data) are considered to be the correct analysis of the data set. We can then compare the alerts generated by the anonymized data to the baseline data alert set.
In terms of alerts we should compare A anony vs. A baseline . The best result would be for the anonymized alerts to match, exactly, the alerts generated in the baseline set. Let us consider the baseline alerts to be the target set. The alerts from the anonymized file will be the generated set. Then we can define several metrics:
True Positive T P = A anony ∩ A baseline | The number of alerts in A anony that are also in A baseline .
False Positive F P = |A anony − (A anony ∩ A baseline )| The number of alerts that were generated by the anonymized file, but were not in the baseline fie.
False Negative F N = |A baseline − (A anony ∩ A baseline )| The number of alerts that were not caught by the anonymized file.
We define the error of a set of alerts as the sum of the false positive and false negative measures, divided by the number of alerts in the baseline file:
The error provides an overall measure of the alert set. When the anonymized alert set matches exactly the baseline data set the error will be 0 (F P = 0, F N = 0). As more alerts are generated the error will rise. 
Results and Analysis
Our objective was to begin to understand the affect of anonymization on the the utility of a log. There are two factors that affect the utility of a log, the anonymization algorithm and the field which is anonymized. We first look at how the field that is anonymized affects utility. We evaluated all 152 pairs of fields and anonymization algorithms. For each pair the number of alerts was calculated. The alerts generated for each pair was compared with the baseline alerts. False Positives/False negatives were calculated based on the definitions above. Table 5 and Table 6 Table 4 : Alerts generated in the baseline unanonymized file. AlertID is the id of the alert; Num is the number of that type of alert generated; Desc is a description of the alert of the pairs of anonymization algorithms and fields. We excluded the results from anonymization of ICMP based fields, that is:
• ICMP TYPE There are 71 field-anonymization pairs such as this, which leaves 81 field-anonymization combinations. Since we filter to include only tcp protocol traffic, the anonymization of the ICMP fields did not affect the utility of the log at all.
The unanonymized file produced 81 alerts. They number and types of alerts produced are summarized in Table 4 . There are a total of 81 alerts generated in the baseline file.
The data for each pair of anonymization algorithm and field is provided in Table 5 and Table 6 . Two factors influence the utility of a log file, the anonymization algorithm and the field it was applied upon. We start by considering the affect of anonymizing a particular field.
To evaluate the affect of anonymizing a particular field, we combine the alerts generated for a particular field over all the anonymization algorithms applied to it. Table 7 shows the number of alerts generated for a field, averaged over all the anonymization algorithms. Table 7 also shows the number of false positives, false negatives, and error.
We can see that several of the fields resulted, in, on average, only 81 alerts. These fields (shown in italics in the table) had 0 error. Judging from these results, we can see that this set of fields did not affect the utility of the log as measured by the IDS metric.
TCP DST PORT and TCP SRC PORT generated the most alerts on average, as well as the most error. Table 5 lists the number of alerts for each anonymization algorithm-field pair. We can see that most of the pairs generated only 2 types of alerts. In the case of BinaryBlackMarker there were 520286 alerts of type 524 generated. Alert 524 is "BAD-TRAFFIC tcp port 0 traffic". The other anonymization algorithms produced the same pattern -the majority of alerts were of type 524.
The reason for this is due to what we substitute for the port field. The BinaryBlackMarker, Substitution, NumericTruncation, and Annihilation algorithms replaced the port field with 0. This resulted in the alert for nearly all the packets in the log (see Table 1 for the parameter settings of the anonymization algorithms). the same problem occurs for the TCP SRC PORT field.
The RandomPermutation algorithm replaced the port number with another, random port number, thus not causing the generation of the BAD-TRAFFIC alert. Clearly the choice of parameter setting can cause a large effect on the utility of a log. Table 7 indicates the impact on utility for anonymizing particular fields. From this data, we can determine a rough ordering for fields in terms of their impact on utility. The field that can affect utility most would be the source and destination port fields. However, much of this is due to the parameter settings. Given a "correct" parameter setting the alerts might be reduced.
Following the port field are the source and destination ip address fields. It is surprising that the IP address impacts the utility of the log. The false positive and false negative scores indicate that anonymizing the fields resulted in the generation of alerts outside of the baseline. Table 5 indicates some interesting differences between anonymization algorithms. Further investigation is warranted to decide why the IP address causes such an impact.
We can clearly see that the choice of field impacts utility. However, we do not know how the anonymization algorithm affects the utility. We have seen some instances of fields where the choice of anonymization algorithm (and even parameters of the algorithm) can cause large differences. Given this, we would expect significant differences between the utility of two fields anonymized with different algorithms. To detect this difference we calculated the number of alerts generated by a particular anonymization algorithm, over all the fields. The results of this are shown in Table 8 .
However, Table 8 will be skewed by the effect of the field. As can be seen, the five algorithms used to anonymize the port fields have a large number of alerts which overshadow the affect of the algorithms on other fields.
To get a better look, we looked at the variance of alerts field by field. For each field we calculated the standard deviation of alerts over anonymization algorithms. Table 9 contains this data. We can see that the choice of anonymization algorithm does affect the utility of a log. The impact of a particular anonymization algorithm needs to be studied further, but it is clear that it does affect the utility.
Related Work
Anonymization techniques and tools are relatively new. The trade off between utility and security is just starting to be explored.
Much of the previous work has focused on determining the best anonymization policy for a specific log under certain conditions. Instead of explicitly focusing on utility, the focus was on the security of the log and attacks on the anonymization algorithms ( [9] [1, 2] , [7, 1, 2] , [4] , [8] ).
Xu et. al. [12] tackle the same issues as this paper, however they focus on the effect of applying kanonymity algorithms on various fields in the log. While k-anonymity is a powerful concept, it is difficult to implement for streaming logs (such as pcap traces). However, their work is complementary to ours.
Coull et. al. [3] does mention utility, but focuses more on inferring sensitive information.
Yurcik et. al [13] provided the first implementation and evaluation of utility using the IDS metric. However, this analysis only considered the number of alerts. The more alerts generated the more "security analysis" is provided. As we have seen above, the types of alerts matter a great deal in evaluating utility.
Conclusions
Anonymization can be a powerful tool to allow greater cooperation between organizations. The need for cooperation is strikingly clear. However, a clear understanding of the needs of the data provider and the client is necessary before flexible, effective sharing between organizations can occur.
The objective of this paper has been to being to formally evaluate the utility vs. security trade off. The IDS metric for determining utility is simple, yet effective in demonstrating the difference in utility when anonymizing different fields.
In this paper, we have provided a thorough evaluation of single field anonymization polices upon tcp protocol PCAP data. We found that the primary impact on utility of a log is not the particular anonymization algorithm, but rather the field that was anonymized.
In addition, we were able to empirically show a range of utilities for a log based on the field that was anonymized. The loss of utility was large for ports and ip addresses. There was some loss of utility for fields the ID, sequence number, flags, timestamp, and ack no.. However, for many of the fields there was no change in utility when anonymized.
This empirical evaluation provides the basis for further work on studying the impact of anonymization on the utility of a log.
Future Work
There are numerous ways in which this work can be extended. First of all, it is clear that evaluating utility via Snort generated IDS alerts will cause the utility to depend upon the rule set. In fact it is as of yet unclear how the rule set impacts the utility measure.
The strength of an anonymization algorithm is a measure of how difficult it is to "break" or "deanonyimize" a log that has been anonymized via the algorithm. It is clear that we want strong anonymization algorithms so that attackers will have a difficult time to break the algorithm. As [10] points out, there is a trade off between the security of an anonymization algorithm and the utility of the log. We have not discussed the strength of an anonymization algorithm in this work.
Our work is currently limited to anonymization policies on single fields with a single algorithm. Our next step would be to extend this work to multiple field anonymization policies. ( [13] used multi-field policies, however as we mentioned above they only counted the number of alerts which did not provide enough detail).
In these experiments we limited ourselves to tcp protocol data. However non-tcp protocol are is very useful for detecting security threats an vulnerabilities. Will expand our technique to towrk on more than just tcp data in the future.
Finally, we will work with more realistic data. The DARPA evaluation data set is useful because it is supervised, however it is not realistic. In the future we will be gaining access to realistic data that we can use instead of the DARPA data. Table 7 : Average number of alerts generated over all anonymization algorithms applied to a field. Field is the field being anonymized, AvgAlerts is the average number of alerts generated, MaxAlerts is the maximum number of alerts generated. MinAlerts is the minimum number of alerts generated. AvgFP is the average number of false positives. AvgFN is the average number of false negatives. AvgError is the average error. The number of alerts generated in the baseline file was 81.
AnonyAlg
AvgAlerts Table 8 : Average number of alerts generated over all anonymization algorithms applied to a field. AnonyAlg is the anonymization algorithm being anonymized, AvgAlerts is the average number of alerts generated, MaxAlerts is the maximum number of alerts generated. MinAlerts is the minimum number of alerts generated. AvgFP is the average number of false positives. AvgFN is the average number of false negatives.
AvgError is the average error.
